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In the software world, high complexity of a problem solution comes along with a
high risk for bugs and vulnerabilities. This correlation is particular perturbing for
todays commodity operating systems with their tremendous complexity. The numer-
ous approaches to increase the user’s confidence in the correct functioning of software
comprise exhaustive tests, code auditing, static code analysis, and formal verification.
Such quality-assurance measures are either rather shallow or they scale badly with
increasing complexity.
The operating-system design presented in this paper focuses on the root of the
problem by providing means to minimize the underlying system complexity for each
security-sensitive application individually. On the other hand, we want to enable mul-
tiple applications to execute on the system at the same time whereas each application
may have different functional requirements from the operating system. Todays op-
erating systems provide a functional superset of the requirements of all applications
and thus, violate the principle of minimalism for each single application. We resolve
the conflict between the principle of minimalism and the versatility of the operating
system by decomposing the operating system into small components and by provid-
ing a way to execute those components isolated and independent from each other.
Components can be device drivers, protocol stacks such as file systems and network
stacks, native applications, and containers for executing legacy software. Each ap-
plication depends only on the functionality of a bounded set of components that we
call application-specific trusted computing base (TCB). If the TCBs of two applications are
executed completely isolated and independent from each other, we consider both TCBs
as minimal.
In practice however, we want to share physical resources between multiple applica-
tions without sacrificing their independence. Therefore, the operating-system design
has to enable the assignment of physical resources to each application and its TCB to
maintain independence from other applications. Furthermore, rather than living in
complete isolation, components require to communicate with each other to cooperate.
The operating-system design must enable components to create other components and
get them to know each other while maintaining isolation from uninvolved parts of the
system.
First, we narrow our goals and pose our mayor challenges in Section 1. Section 2
introduces our fundamental concepts and protocols that apply to each component in
the system. In Section 3, we present the one component that is mandatory part of
each TCB, enables the bootstrapping of the system, and provides abstractions for the
lowest-level resources. We exercise the composition of the presented mechanisms by
the means of process creation in Section 4.
1
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1 Goals and Challenges
Our design process was guided by the vision to execute the following types of components in a
secure manner concurrently on one machine:
Device drivers
Device drivers translate the facilities of raw physical devices to device-class-specific inter-
faces to be used by other components. They contain no security policies and provide their
services to only one client component per device.
Services that multiplex resources
To make one physical resource (e. g., a device) usable by multiple components at the same
time, the physical resource must be translated to multiple virtual resources. For example, a
frame buffer provided by a device driver can only be used by one client at the same time. A
window system multiplexes this physical resource to make it available to multiple clients.
Other examples are an audio mixer or a virtual network hub. In contrast to a device driver,
a resource multiplexer deals with multiple clients and therefore, plays a crucial role for main-
taining the independence and isolation of its clients from each other.
Protocol stacks
Protocol stacks translate low-level protocols to a higher and more applicable level. For ex-
ample, a file system translates a block-device protocol to a file abstraction, a TCP/IP stack
translates network packets to a socket abstraction, or a widget set maps high-level GUI ele-
ments to pixels. Compared to resource multiplexers, protocol stacks are typically an order of
magnitude more complex. Protocol stacks may also act as resource multiplexers. In this case
however, high complexity puts the independence and isolation of multiple clients at a high
risk. Therefore, our design should enable the instantiation of protocol stacks per application.
For example, instead of letting a security-sensitive application share one TCP/IP stack with
multiple other (untrusted) applications, it could use a dedicated instance of a TCP/IP stack
to increase its independence and isolation from the other applications.
Containers for executing legacy software
A legacy container provides an environment for the execution of existing legacy software.
This can be achieved by the means of a virtual machine (e. g., a Java VM, a virtual PC),
a compatible programming API (e. g., POSIX, Qt), a language environment (e. g., LISP), or
a script interpreter. In the majority of cases, we regard legacy software as an untrusted
black box. One particular example for legacy software are untrusted legacy device drivers.
In this case, the container has to protect the physical hardware from potentially malicious
device accesses by the untrusted driver. Legacy software may be extremely complex and
resource demanding, for example the Firefox web browser executed on top of the X window
system and the Linux kernel inside a virtualized PC. In this case, the legacy container may
implement sophisticated techniques such as virtual memory.
Small custom security-sensitive applications
Alongside legacy software, small custom applications implement crucial security-sensitive
functionality. In contrast to legacy software, which we mostly regard as untrusted anyway,
a low TCB complexity for custom applications is of extreme importance. Given the special
liability of such an application, it is very carefully designed, low complex, and requires
as little as possible infrastructure. A typical example is a cryptographic component that
protects credentials of the user. Such an application does not require swapping (virtual
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memory), a POSIX API, or a complete C library. Instead, the main objectives of such an
application are to avoid as much as possible code from being included in its TCB and to
keep its requirements at a minimum.
Our design must be able to create and destroy subsystems that are composed of multiple such
components. The isolation requirement as stated in the introduction raises the question of how to
organize the locality of name spaces and how to distribute access from components to other com-
ponents within the system. The independence requirement demands the assignment of physical
resources to components such that different applications do not interfere. Instead of managing ac-
cess control and physical resources from a central place, we desire a distributed way for applying
policy for trading and revocating resources and for delegating rights.
3
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2 Interfaces and Mechanisms
The system is structured as a tree. The nodes of the tree are processes. A node, for which sub-
nodes exist, is called the parent of these sub-nodes (children). The parent creates children out of its
own resources and defines their execution environment. Each process can announce services to
its parent. The parent, in turn, can mediate such a service to his other children. When a child is
created, its parent provides the initial contact to the outer world via the following interface:
void exit(int exit_value);
Capability session(String service_name,
String args);
void close(Capability session_cap);
int announce(String service_name,
Capability service_root_cap);
int transfer_quota(Capability to_session_cap,
String amount);
exit is called by a child to request its own termination.
session is called by a child to request a connection to the specified service as known by his
parent whereas service_name is the name of the desired service interface. The way of
resolving or even denying a session request depends on the policy of the parent. The
args parameter contains construction arguments for the session to be created. In particular,
args contains a specification of resources that the process is willing to donate to the server
during the session lifetime.
close is called by a child to inform its parent that the specified session is no longer needed. The
parent should close the session and hand back donated resources to the child.
announce is called by a child to register a locally implemented service at his parent. Hence, this
child is a server.
transfer_quota enables a child to extend its resource donation to the server that provides the
specified session.
We provide a detailed description and motivation for the different functions in Sections 2.1 and
2.2.
2.1 Servers
Each process may implement services and announce them via the announce function of the par-
ent interface. When announcing a service, the server specifies a root capability for the implemented
service. The interface of the root capability enables the parent to create, configure, and close ses-
sions of the service:
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service_root
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service_root)
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service_root
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Child2
root list:
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Figure 1: Announcement of a service by a child (server). Colored circles at the edge of a component repre-
sent remotely accessible objects. Small circles inside a component represent a reference (Capabil-
ity) to a remote object. A cross-component reference to a remote object is illustrated by a dashed
arrow. An opaque arrow symbolizes a RPC call/return.
Capability session(String args);
int transfer_quota(Capability to_session_cap,
String amount);
void close(Capability session_cap);
Figure 1 illustrates an announcement of a service. Initially, each child has a capability to its
parent. After Child1 announces its service “Service”, its parent knows the root capability of this
service under the local name srv1_r and stores the root capability with the announced service
name in its root list. The root capability is intended to be used and kept by the parent only.
When a parent calls the session function of the root interface of a server child, the server
creates a new client session and returns the corresponding client_session capability. This
session capability provides the actual service-specific interface. The parent can use it directly or it
may pass it to other processes, in particular to another child that requested the session. In Figure
2, Child2 initiates the creation of a “Service” session by a session call at its parent capability
(1). The parent uses its root list to look up the root capability that matches the service name
“Service” (2) and calls the session function at the server (3). Child1 the server creates a new
session (session1) and returns the session capability as result of the session call (4). The
parent now knows the new session under the local name srv1_s1 (5) and passes the session
capability as return value of Child2’s initial session call (6). The parent maintains a session list,
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Figure 2: Service request by a client.
which stores the interrelation between children and their created sessions. Now, Child2 has a
direct communication channel to session1 provided by the server (Child1) (7).
The close function of the root interface instructs the server to destroy the specified session and
to release all session-specific resources.
Even though the prior examples involved only one parent, the announce-request mechanism
can be used recursively for tree structures of any depth and thus allow for partitioning the sys-
tem into subsystems that can cooperate with each other whereas parents are always in complete
control over the communication and resource usage of their children (and their subsystems).
Figure 3 depicts a nested subsystem on the left. Child1 announces his service named “Service”
at his parent that, in turn, announces a service named “Service” at the Grandparent. The service
names do not need to be identical. Their meaning spans to their immediate parent only and
there may be a name remapping on each hierarchy level. Each parent can decide upon itself
whether to further announce services of their children to the outer world or not. The parent can
announce Child1’s service to the grandparent by creating a new root capability to a local service
that forwards session-creation and closing requests to Child1. Both Parent and Grandparent keep
their local root lists. In a second step, Parent2 initiates the creation of a session to the service by
issuing a session request at the Grandparent (1). Grandparent uses its root list to look up the
service-providing child (from Grandparent’s local view) Parent1 (2). Parent1 in turn, implements
the service not by itself but delegates the session request to Child1 by calling the session
function of the actual “Service” root interface (3). The session capability, created by Child1 (4), can
now be passed to Child1 as return value of nested session calls (5, 6). Each involved node keeps
the local knowledge about the created session such that later, the session can be closed in the same
nested fashion.
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Figure 3: Announcement and request of a service in a subsystem. For simplicity, parent capabilities are not
displayed.
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2.2 Quota
Each process that provides services to other processes consumes resources on behalf of it clients.
Such a server requires memory to maintain session-specific state, processing time to perform the
actual service function, and eventually further system resources (e. g., bus bandwidth) dependent
on client requests. To avoid denial-of-service problems, a server must not allocate such resources
from its own budget but let the client pay. Therefore, a mechanism for donating resource quotas
from the client to the server is required. Both client and server may be arbitrary nodes in the
process tree. In the following, we examine the trading of resource quotas within the recursive
system structure using memory as an example.
When creating a child, the parent assigns a part of its own memory quota to the new child.
During the lifetime of the child, the parent can further transfer quota back and forth between the
child’s and its own account. Because the parent creates its children out of its own resources, it has
a natural interest to correctly manage child quotas. When a child requests a session to a service, it
can bind a part of its quota to the new session by specifying a resource donation as an argument.
When receiving a session request, the parent has to distinct three different cases, dependent on
where the corresponding server resides:
Parent provides service
If the parent provides the requested services by itself, it transfers the donated amount of
memory quota from the requesting child’s account to its own account to compensate the
session-specific memory allocation on behalf of its own child.
Server is another child
If there exists a matching entry in the parent’s root list, the requested service is provided by
another child (or a node within the child subsystem). In this case, the parent transfers the
donated memory quota from the requesting child to the service-providing child.
Delegation to grandparent
The parent may decide to delegate the session request to his own parent because the re-
quested service is provided by a lower node of the process tree. Thus, the parent will re-
quest a session on behalf of his child. The grandparent neither knows nor cares about the
actual origin of the request and will simply decrease the memory quota of the parent. For
this reason, the parent transfers the donated memory quota from the requesting child to his
own account before calling the grandparent.
This algorithm works recursively. Once, the server receives the session request, it checks if the
donated memory quota suffices for storing the session-specific data and, on success, creates the
session. If the initial quota donation turns out to be too scarce during the lifetime of a session, the
client may make further donations via the transfer_quota function of the parent interface that
works analogously.
If a child requests to close a session, the parent must distinguish the three cases as above. Once,
the server requests to close the session, the child is responsible to release all resources that were
used for this session. After the server releases the session-specific resources, the server’s quota can
be decreased to the prior state. However, an ill-behaving server may fail to release those resources
by malice or caused by a bug.
If the misbehaving service was provided by the parent himself, it has the full authority to not
hand back session-quota to his child. If the misbehaving service was provided by the grandparent,
the parent (and its whole subsystem) has to subordinate. If, however, the service was provided by
another child and the child refuses to release resources, decreasing its quota after closing the ses-
sion will fail. It is up to the policy of the parent to handle such a failure either by punishing (e. g.,
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Figure 4: Successive application of policies at the creation time of a new session.
killing the the misbehaving server) or by granting more of its own quota. Generally, misbehavior
is against the server’s own interests and each server would obey the parent’s close request to
avoid intervention.
2.3 Successive policy management
For supporting a high variety of security policies for access control, we require a way to bind
properties and restrictions to sessions. For example, a session to a file service would require
to know the user identity and a group identity to enforce the Unix access-control scheme. On
session creation, the session call takes an args argument that can be used for that purpose.
It is a list of tag-value pairs describing the session properties. By convention, the list is ordered
by attribute priority starting with the most important property. The server uses these args as
construction arguments for the new session and enforces the security policy as expressed by args
accordingly. Whereas the client defines its desired session-construction arguments, each node that
is incorporated in the session creation can alter these arguments in any way and may add further
properties. This effectively enables each parent to impose any desired restrictions to sessions
created by its children. This concept works recursively and enables each node in the process
hierarchy to control exactly the properties that it knows and cares about. As a side note, the
specification of resource donations as described in the Section 2.2 is performed with the same
mechanism. A resource donation is a property of a session.
Figure 4 shows an example scenario. A user application issues the creation of a new session
to the GUI server and specifies its wish for reading user input and using the string “Terminal”
as window label (1). The parent of the user application is the user manager that introduces user
identities into the system and wants to ensure that each displayed window gets tagged with the
user and the executed program. Therefore, it overrides the label attribute with more accurate
information (2). Note that the modified argument is now the head of the argument list. The
parent of the user manager, in turn, implements further policies. In the example, Init’s policy
prohibits the user-manager subtree from reading input (for example to disable access to the system
beyond official working hours) by redefining the input attribute and leaving all other attributes
unchanged (3). The actual GUI server observes the final result of the successively changed session-
construction arguments (4) and it is responsible for enforcing the specified policy for the lifetime
of the session. Once a session got established, its properties are fixed and cannot be changed.
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3 Core - the root of the process tree
Core is the first user-level program that takes control when starting up the system. It has access to
the raw physical resources and converts them to abstractions that enable multiple programs to use
these resources. In particular, core converts the physical address space to higher-level containers
called dataspaces. A dataspace represents a contiguous physical address space region with an ar-
bitrary size (at page-size granularity). Multiple processes can make the same dataspace accessible
in their local address spaces. The system on top of core never deals with physical memory pages
but uses this uniform abstraction to work with memory, memory-mapped I/O regions, and ROM
areas.
Using only contiguous dataspaces may lead to fragmentation of the physical address space. This property is, however, only
required by a few rare cases (e. g., DMA transfers). Therefore, later versions of the design will support non-contiguous dataspaces.
Furthermore, core provides all prerequisites to bootstrap the process tree. These prerequisites
comprise services for creating processes and threads, for allocating memory, for accessing boot-
time-present files, and for managing address space layouts. Core is almost free from policy. There
are no configuration options. The only policy of core is the startup of the init process to which
core grants all available resources to init.
In the following, we explain the session interfaces of core’s services in detail.
3.1 RAM - allocator for physical memory
A RAM session is a quota-bounded allocator of blocks from physical memory. There are no RAM-
specific session-construction arguments. Immediately after the creation of a RAM session, its
quota is zero. To make the RAM session functional, it must be loaded with quota from another
already existing RAM session, which we call reference account. The reference account of a RAM
session can be defined initially via:
int ref_account(Capability ram_session_cap);
Once the reference account is defined, quota can be transferred back and forth between the refer-
ence account and the new RAM session with:
int transfer_quota(Capability ram_session_cap, size_t amount);
Provided, the RAM session has enough quota, a dataspace of a given size can be allocated with:
Capability alloc(size_t size);
The result value of alloc is a capability to the dataspace object implemented in core. This capa-
bility can be communicated to other processes and can be used to make the dataspace’s physical-
memory region accessible from these processes. An allocated dataspace can be released with:
void free(Capability ds_cap);
The alloc and free calls track the used-quota information of the RAM session accordingly.
Current statistical information about the quota limit and the used quota can be retrieved by:
size_t quota();
size_t used();
Closing a RAM session implicitly destroys all allocated dataspaces.
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3.2 ROM - boot-time-file access
A ROM session represents a boot-time-present read-only file. This may be a module provided by
the boot loader or a part of a static ROM image. On session construction, a file identifier must be
specified as session argument using the tag filename. The available filenames are not fixed but
depend on the actual deployment. On some platforms, core may provide logical files for special
memory objects such as the GRUB multiboot info structure or a kernel info page. The ROM session
enables the actual read access to the file by exporting the file as dataspace:
Capability dataspace();
3.3 IO_MEM - memory mapped I/O access
With IO_MEM, core provides a dataspace abstraction for non-memory parts of the physical ad-
dress space such as memory-mapped I/O regions or BIOS areas. In contrast to a memory block
that is used for storing information of which the physical location in memory is of no matter, a
non-memory object has a special semantics attached to its location within the physical address
space. Its location is either fixed (by standard) or can be determined at runtime, for example by
scanning the PCI bus for PCI resources. If the physical location of such a non-memory object is
known, an IO_MEM session can be created by specifying io_mem_base and io_mem_size as
session construction arguments. The IO_MEM session then provides the specified physical mem-
ory area as dataspace:
Capability dataspace();
There are further services required for full device-driver support outside of core. For example, services to program I/O ports and
install IRQ handlers. These services are not specified yet.
3.4 RM - managing address space layouts
RM is a region manager service that allows for constructing address space layouts (region map)
from dataspaces and that provides support for assigning region maps to processes by paging the
process’ threads. Each RM session corresponds to one region map. After creating a new RM
session, dataspaces can be attached to the region map via:
void *attach(Capability ds_cap,
size_t size=0, off_t offset=0,
addr_t local_addr = 0);
The attach function inserts the specified dataspace into the region map and returns the actually
used start position within the region map. By using the default arguments, the region manager
chooses an appropriate position that is large enough to hold the whole dataspace. Alternatively,
the caller of attach can attach any sub-range of the dataspace at a specified target position to
the region map by specifying the optional arguments. Note that the interface allows for the same
dataspace to be attached not only to multiple region maps but also multiple times to the same
region map. As the counterpart to attach, detach removes dataspaces from the region map:
void detach(void *local_addr);
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The region manager determines the dataspace at the specified local_addr (not necessarily the
start address) and removes the whole dataspace from the region map. To enable the use of a RM
session by a process, we must associate it with each thread running in the process. The function
Capability add_client(Capability thread);
returns a pager that handles the page faults of the specified thread according to the region map.
With subsequent page faults caused by the thread, the address-space layout described by the
region map becomes valid for the process that is executing the thread.
3.5 CPU - allocator for processing time
A CPU session is an allocator for processing time that allows for the creation, the control, and the
destruction of threads of execution. There are no session arguments used. The functionality of
starting and killing threads is provided by two functions:
Capability create_thread(const char* name);
void kill_thread(Capability thread_cap);
The create_thread function takes a symbolic thread name (that is only used for debugging
purposes) and returns a capability to the new thread. This capability refers to a thread object with
the following operations:
int set_pager(Capability pager_cap);
int start(addr_t ip, addr_t sp);
The set_pager function registers the thread’s pager whereas pager_cap (obtained by calling
add_client at a RM session) refers to the RM session to be used as address-space layout. For
starting the actual execution of the thread, its initial instruction pointer (ip) and stack pointer (sp)
must be specified for the start operation.
Future versions of the CPU service will provide means to further control the thread during execution (e. g., pause, execution of
only one instruction), acquiring thread state (current registers), and configuring scheduling parameters.
3.6 TASK - providing address spaces
A TASK session corresponds to a memory protection domain (task). Together with one or more
threads and an address-space layout (RM session), it forms a process. There are no session argu-
ments. After session creation, the task contains no threads. Once a new thread got created from a
CPU session, it can be assigned to the task by calling:
int bind_thread(Capability thread);
3.7 CAP - allocator for capabilities
A capability is a system-wide unique object identity that typically refers to a remote object im-
plemented by a service. For each object to be made remotely accessible, the service creates a new
capability associated with the local object. CAP is a service to allocate and free capabilities:
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Capability alloc(Capability ep_cap);
void free(Capability cap);
The alloc function takes an entrypoint capability as argument, which is the communication re-
ceiver for invocations of the new capability’s RPC interface.
3.8 LOG - debug output facility
The LOG service is used by the lowest-level system components such as the init process for print-
ing debug output. Each LOG session takes a label string as session argument, which is used to
prefix the debug output of this session. This enables developers to distinguish multiple producers
of debug output. The function
size_t write(const char *string);
outputs the specified string to the debug-output backend of core.
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4 Process creation
The previous section presented the services implemented by core. In this section, we show how
to combine these basic mechanisms to create and execute a process. Process creation serves as a
prime example for our general approach to first provide very simple functional primitives and
then solve complex problems using a composition of these primitives. We use slightly simpli-
fied pseudo code to illustrate this procedure. The env() object refers to the environment of the
creating process, which contains its RM session and RAM session.
Obtaining the executable ELF binary
If the binary is available as ROM object, we can access its data by creating a ROM session
with the binary’s name as argument and attaching its dataspace to our local address space:
Capability file_cap = session("ROM", "filename=init");
Capability ds_cap = Rom_session_client(file_cap).dataspace();
void *elf_addr = env()->rm_session()->attach(ds_cap);
The variable elf_addr now points to the start of the binary data.
ELF binary decoding and creation of the new region map
We create a new region map using the RM service:
Capability rm_cap;
rm_cap = session("RM", "");
Rm_session_client rsc(rm_cap);
Initially, this region map is empty. The ELF binary contains CODE, DATA, and BSS sections.
For each section, we add a dataspace to the region map. For read-only CODE and DATA
sections, we attach the corresponding ranges of the original ELF dataspace (ds_cap):
rsc.attach(ds_cap, size, offset, addr);
The size and offset arguments specify the location of the section within the ELF image.
The addr argument defines the desired start position at the region map. For each BSS and
DATA section, we allocate a read-writeable RAM dataspace
Capability rw_cap = env()->ram_session()->alloc(section_size);
and assign its initial content (zero for BSS sections, copy of ELF DATA sections).
void *sec_addr = env()->rm_session()->attach(rw_cap);
... /* write to buffer at sec_addr */
env()->rm_session()->detach(sec_addr);
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After iterating through all ELF sections, the region map of the new process is completely
initialized.
Creating the first thread
For creating the main thread of the new process, we create a new CPU session from which
we allocate the thread:
Capability cpu_cap = session("CPU", "");
Cpu_session_client csc(cpu_cap);
Capability thread_cap = csc.create_thread();
Cpu_thread_client ctc(thread_cap);
When the thread starts its execution and fetches its first instruction, it will immediately trig-
ger a page fault. Therefore, we need to assign a page-fault handler (pager) to the thread.
With resolving subsequent page faults, the pager will populate the address space in which
the thread is executed with memory mappings according to a region map:
Capability pager_cap = rsc.add_client(thread_cap);
ctc.set_pager(pager_cap);
Creating an adress space (task)
The new process’ protection domain (task) corresponds to a TASK session:
Capability task_cap = session("TASK", "");
Task_session_client tsc(task_cap);
Assigning the first thread to the task
tsc.bind_thread(thread_cap);
Starting the execution
Now that we defined the relationship of the process’ region map, its main thread, and its
address space, we can start the process by specifying the initial instruction pointer and stack
pointer as obtained from the ELF binary.
ctc.start(ip, sp);
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5 Framework infrastructure
Apart from the very fundamental mechanisms implemented by core, all higher-level services have
to be implemented as part of the process tree on top of core. There are a number of frameworks
at hand that provide convenient interfaces to be used by such components. In this section, we
outline the most important frameworks.
5.1 Communication
The basic mode of operation of our RPC framework is based on C++ streams. It uses four differ-
ent stream classes: Ipc_ostream for sending messages, Ipc_istream for receiving messages,
Ipc_client for performing RPC calls, and Ipc_server for dispatching RPC calls. In the fol-
lowing, we use illustrative examples.
Sending a message
Ipc_ostream sender(dst, &snd_buf);
sender << a << b << IPC_SEND;
The object sender is an output stream that is initialized with a communication endpoint
(dst) and a message buffer (snd_buf). For sending the message, we sequentially insert
both arguments into the stream to transform the arguments to a message and finally invoke
the IPC mechanism of the kernel by inserting the special object IPC_SEND.
Receiving a message
int a, b;
Ipc_istream receiver(&rcv_buf);
receiver >> IPC_WAIT >> a >> b;
For creating the receiver input stream object, we specify a receive message buffer as ar-
gument that can hold one incoming message. By extracting the special object IPC_WAIT
from the receiver, we block for a new message to be stored into rcv_buf. After returning
from the blocking receive operation, we use the extraction operator to unmarshal the message
argument by argument.
Performing a RPC call
Ipc_client client(dst, &snd_buf, &rcv_buf);
int result;
client << OPCODE_FUNC1 << 1 << 2
<< IPC_CALL >> result;
The first argument is a constant that references one among many server functions. It is
followed by the actual server-function arguments. All arguments are marshalled into the
snd_buf. When inserting the special object IPC_CALL into the client stream, the client
blocks for the result of the RPC. After receiving the result message in rcv_buf, the RPC
results can be sequentially unmarshalled via the extraction operator. Note that rcv_buf
and snd_buf may use the same backing store as both buffers are used interleaved.
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Dispatching a RPC call
Ipc_server server(&snd_buf, &rcv_buf);
while (1) {
int opcode;
server >> IPC_REPLY_WAIT >> opcode;
switch (opcode) {
case OPCODE_FUNC1:
{
int a, b, ret;
server >> a >> b;
server << func1(a, b);
break;
}
..
}
}
The special object IPC_REPLY_WAIT replies the request of the previous server-loop iteration
with the message stored in snd_buf (ignored for the first iteration) and then waits for an in-
coming RPC request to be received in rcv_buf. By convention, the first message argument
contains the opcode to identify the server function to handle the request. After extracting
the opcode from the server stream, we branch into a server-function-specific wrapper that
reads the function arguments, calls the actual server function, and inserts the function re-
sult into the server stream. The result message is to be delivered at the beginning of the
next server-loop iteration. The two-stage argument-message parsing (the opcode to select
the server function, reading the server-function arguments) is simply done by subsequent
extraction operations.
5.2 Server framework
Each component that makes local objects remotely accessible to other components has to provide
means to dispatch RPC requests that refer to different objects. This procedure highly depends on
the mechanisms provided by the underlying kernel. The primary motivation of the server frame-
work is to hide actual kernel paradigms for communication, control flow, and the implementation
of local names (capabilities) behind a generic interface. The server framework unifies the control
flow of RPC dispatching and the mapping between capabilities and local objects using the classes
depicted in Figure 5.
Object_pool is an associative array that maps capabilities from/to local objects. Because ca-
pabilities are protected kernel objects, the object pool’s functionality is supported by the
kernel.
On L4v2 and Linux, capabilities are not protected by the kernel but are implemented as unique IDs. On these base platforms, the
object pool performs the simple mapping of such unique IDs to object pointers in the local address space.
Server_object is an object-pool entry that contains a dispatch function. To make a lo-
cal object type available to remote components, the local object type must inherit from
Server_object and provide the implementation of the dispatch function as described in
Section 5.1.
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Figure 5: Relationships between the classes of the server object framework
Server_entrypoint is an object pool that acts as a logical communication entrypoint. It can
manage any number of server objects. When registering a server object to be managed by
a server entrypoint (manage method), a capability for this object gets created. This capa-
bility can be communicated to other processes, which can then use the server object’s RPC
interface.
Server_activation is the stack (or thread) to be used for handling RPC requests of an entry-
point. The interface of the server entrypoint envisions to attach multiple server activations
to one and the same server entrypoint to enable the concurrent handling of multiple RPC
requests.
On L4v2 and Linux however, exactly one server activation must be attached to a server entrypoint. This implicates that RPC
requests are handled in a strictly serialized manner and one blocking server function delays all other pending RPC requests referring
the same server entrypoint. Concurrent handling of RPC requests should be realized with multiple (completely independent) server
entrypoints.
5.3 Process environment
As described in Section 2, a newly created process can only communicate to its immediate parent
via its parent capability. This parent capability gets created “magically” dependent on the actual
platform.
For example, on the L4v2 platform, the parent writes the information about the parent capability to a defined position of the new
process’ address space after decoding the ELF image. On the Linux platform, the parent uses environment variables to communicate
the parent capability to the child.
Before entering the main function of the new process, the process’ startup code crt0 is executed
and initializes the environment framework. The environment contains RPC communication stubs
for communicating with the parent and the process’ RM session, CPU session, TASK session, and
RAM session. Furthermore, the environment contains a heap that uses the process’ RAM session
as backing store. The environment can be used from the actual program by dereferencing the
pointer returned by the global function:
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Env *env();
5.4 Child management
The class Child provides a generic and extensible abstraction to unify the creation of child pro-
cesses, serve parent-interface requests, and to perform the book keeping of open sessions. Differ-
ent access-control and resource-trading policies can be realized by inheriting from this class and
supplementing suitable parent-interface server functions.
A child process can be created by instantiating a Child object:
Child(const char *name,
Capability elf_ds_cap,
Capability ram_session_cap,
Capability cpu_session_cap,
Cap_session *cap_session,
char *args[])
The name parameter is only used for debugging. The args parameter is not yet supported.
5.5 Heap partitioning
In Section 1 where we introduced the different types of components composing our system, we
highlighted resource multiplexers as being critical for maintaining the isolation and independence
of applications from each other. If a flawed resource multiplexer serves multiple clients at a time,
information may leak from one client to another (corrupting isolation) or different clients may
interfere in sharing limited physical resources (corrupting independence). One particular limited
resource that is typically shared among all clients is the heap of the server. If the server per-
forms heap allocations on behalf of one client, this resource may exhaust and renders the service
unavailable to all other clients (denial of service). The resource-trading concept as presented in
Section 2.2 enables clients to donate memory quota to a server during the use of a session. If the
server’s parent closes the session on request of the client, the donated resources must be released
by the server. In order to comply with the request to avoid intervention by its parent, the server
must store the state of each session on dedicated dataspaces that can be released independently
from other sessions. Instead of using one heap to hold anonymous memory allocations, the server
creates a heap partition for each client and performs client-specific allocations exclusively on the
corresponding heap partition. There exist two different classes to assist developers in partitioning
the heap:
Heap is an allocator that allocates chunks of memory as dataspaces from a RAM session. Each
chunk may hold multiple allocations. This kind of heap corresponds loosely to a classical
heap and can be used to allocate a high number of small memory objects. The used backing
store gets released on the destruction of the heap.
Sliced_heap is an allocator that uses a dedicated dataspace for each allocation. Therefore, each
allocated block can be released independently from all other allocations.
The Sliced_heap must be used to obtain the actual session objects and store them in indepen-
dent dataspaces. Dynamic memory allocations during the lifetime of a session must be performed
by a Heap as member of the session object. When closing a session, the session object including the
heap partition gets destroyed and all backing-store dataspaces can be released without interfering
other clients.
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6 Limitations and Outlook
In its current incarnation, the design is subject to a number of limitations. As a prime example
for managing resources, we focused our work on physical memory and ignored other prominent
resource types such as processing time, bus bandwidth, and network bandwidth. We intend to
apply the same methodology that we developed for physical memory to other resource types anal-
ogously in later design revisions. We do not cover features such as virtual-memory or transparent
copy-on-write support, which we regard as non-essential at the current stage. At this point, we
also do not provide specifics about the device-driver infrastructure and legacy-software contain-
ers. Note that the presented design does not fundamentally contradict to the support of these
features. To keep the design space at a manageable dimension, we have purposely excluded these
items from the initial set of problems to address.
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